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Preface
the eastern democratic republic of the congo (drc) has been 
mired in violence for two decades and continues to be plagued 
by rampant insecurity. Yet, the drivers of this insecurity remain 
poorly understood. the rift Valley Institute’s Usalama Project 
(Usalama means ‘safety’ or ‘security’ in swahili) is a field-based, 
partner-driven research initiative that aims to examine dynamics 
of conflict and violence and their effects on congolese society. 
the first phase of the Usalama Project (2012–2013) focused on 
‘understanding armed groups’ while the second phase (2015–2016) 
investigated ‘governance in conflict’. the third phase (2018–2019) 
explores ‘insecurity in the city’ and the role of state and non-state 
actors in the provision of security, and citizens’ perceptions of, 
experiences with and responses to insecurity. the third phase 
was carried out in partnership with the Bukavu-based Groupe 
d’Etudes sur les Conflits et la Sécurité Humaine (GEc-sH). the project 
is guided by a series of questions: Who are the main agents of 
security and insecurity in the city? What are the drivers, logics 
and trends of urban insecurity? What are residents’ perceptions 
of insecurity? and how do they deal with insecurity in their 
everyday lives? 
the project takes a primarily qualitative approach, drawing 
on extensive fieldwork by both international and congolese 
researchers. Fieldwork for this report took place between March 
and april 2019. a total of 28 interviews and 12 focus group discus-
sions were conducted in Goma, complimented by the author’s 
previous research, and desk-based research with a variety of 
academic, government, media and nGO resources. Many of 
the interviews for this report were conducted on condition of 
anonymity. therefore, identifying information is limited to a 
neutral indicator with a location and a date, e.g. Usalama Project 
III interview with police officer, Goma, 25 March 2019. In the 
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course of the research, accounts of potentially disputed events 
were confirmed by multiple sources with first-hand knowledge 
of the events under discussion. 
the ‘Insecurity in the city’ phase of the Usalama Project 
is part of the solutions for Peace and recovery Project (sPr), 
funded by the United states agency for International develop-
ment (UsaId).
summary
• Goma, the largest city in north kivu, is suffering from a rise 
in urban insecurity. Historically, insecurity has hit the city in 
waves, often associated with conflict dynamics in the wider 
region, and its history of occupation by rebel forces, both 
during and after the congo Wars. 
• different forms of insecurity affect Goma than in the eastern 
drc’s rural areas, which have received most attention from 
researchers. the causes of insecurity fluctuate over time, but 
they are often related to political instability or the intensifica-
tion of armed group activities in the city’s rural hinterlands.
• ndosho and Mugunga—the focus of this report—are neigh-
bourhoods located on the western periphery of Goma, 
bordering Virunga national Park. they both harbour large 
populations of former IdPs and refugees, which has contrib-
uted to limited social cohesion within both neighbourhoods. 
they both also suffer from cycles of extreme insecurity.  
• From the beginning of 2019, Goma in general, and ndosho and 
Mugunga specifically, experienced dramatic levels of urban 
violence in an unstable post-election period as established 
patronage networks shifted. this was compounded by an 
economic crisis, which forced civilians and security personnel 
to seek alternative survival mechanisms, often criminal. 
• added to this, the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda 
(FdLr, democratic Forces for the Liberation of rwanda)—a 
rwandan Hutu rebel group based in the eastern congo—have 
allegedly increased activities in the city. However, dominant 
narratives around the involvement of the FdLr in violence 
and criminal activities should be treated with caution. 
• the way residents perceive urban insecurity in Goma is 
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influenced through temporal and spatial dynamics. daytime 
insecurity actors and processes are distinguished from those 
at night; and safety or danger are strongly associated with 
specific locations. In particular, the proximity of Virunga 
national Park is seen by Goma’s residents as a central feature 
of their exposure to violence and insecurity. 
• the impact of urban insecurity on social cohesion cannot be 
overstated; fear, suspicion and paranoia have been instilled in 
ndosho and Mugunga, with people beginning to distrust their 
own families and friends. 
• civil society and community actions have emerged from the 
need for protection and safety. In Goma’s current context of 
insecurity several community initiatives have developed in the 
form of neighbourhood alarm or alert systems, youth associa-
tions or self-defence groups. numerous instances of—often 
violent—popular justice have also been documented. 
• Goma residents have also expressed their outrage at recent 
violence through individual actions, including protest 
marches. those that can afford to have left the worst affected 
neighbourhoods, or even the country, entirely. 
• to address urban insecurity in Goma, the international commu-
nity, congolese and provincial authorities should consider the 
following: 
1. Put the urban issue on the security agenda by adapting 
existing knowledge and approaches, and moving beyond 
a conflict framework;
2. security personnel in peripheral neighbourhoods should 
be properly trained and equipped in order to effectively 
respond to insecurity, for example through the congo’s 
ongoing police reform;
3. End impunity by disentangling the dependency between 
state security forces and criminals through a better 
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understanding of the key interests at skate, combined 
with investments in the judiciary;
4. address the urban dimension of armed group activi-
ties by understanding the city in its broader economic, 
political and military dynamics, which create a complex 
operational context for armed groups;
5. Youth play an active role in community attempts to 
address insecurity and should be included in relevant 
programming to ensure proximity between urban 
residents and security providers.
summary 
1. Introduction 
‘ndosho used to be like paradise—if you compare it 
with what we experience today.’1 
since the start of 2019, a series of murders, violent robberies 
and kidnappings have taken place in peripheral neighbourhoods 
of Goma, a city of around one million people in the eastern 
democratic republic of the congo (hereafter, drc or the congo). 
the rapid rise in violent crime has alarmed city residents and led 
to calls for the local government and security services to respond 
more effectively. there have also been a range of community and 
individual responses. While levels of urban insecurity may be 
higher in 2019 than ever before, urban crime and insecurity are 
not new phenomena in Goma. 
despite its reputation as a zone of security and protection—
partly a consequence of the large police and military deployment 
combined with a Un and nGO presence—insecurity has long 
been an underappreciated part of everyday urban life. With 
academic and policy-related research generally focused on rural 
conflicts in the eastern congo, insecurity in urban areas needs 
further investigation. 
this report maps out the dynamics and experiences of, and 
responses to, urban insecurity in Goma, and its effects on social 
cohesion. First, it demonstrates that urban security levels 
fluctuate over time and are connected to broader political, 
economic and military dynamics in the region. second, urban 
insecurity has a clear spatial component and is dependent on 
the characteristics of particular neighbourhoods. third, urban 
insecurity has had a significant impact on social cohesion.
1   Usalama III Project focus group with female traders, Goma, 9 april 2019.
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a general sense of fear, suspicion and paranoia has been 
instilled in some neighbourhoods, leading people to distrust 
their own families and friends. In response to this, civil society 
and community actors have emerged around the need for 
protection and safety. Finally, dominant narratives around the 
involvement of armed groups in urban violence have been used 
and reproduced for political interests. 
the report makes the case for national and international 
policymakers to engage seriously with the urban dimension 
of insecurity in the eastern congo. cities represent impor-
tant centres of state power, governance and decision-making. 
Moreover, they represent the operational ground for a wide range 
of civil society organizations and associational life. to under-
stand the profound effects of militarization, displacement and 
violence on social cohesion in the drc, urban dynamics should 
be taken into account. 
2. a History of Violence
Founded in 1906 as a colonial administrative and military post on 
the rwandan border, the presence of Lake kivu to the south, and 
the nyiragongo Volcano and the Virunga national Park to the 
north meant that the city of Goma could only grow westwards. 
as such, it has expanded as one horizontal urbanized stretch 
along the shore of Lake kivu towards Masisi. Urban develop-
ment in Goma followed a classic colonial planning scheme, 
with separate neighbourhoods for Europeans (cité Européenne) 
and congolese (cité indigene). the latter was limited to contem-
porary Birere—a crowded, popular neighbourhood located on 
the rwandan border. the neighbourhoods for Europeans were 
located in the current city centre (the quartier les Volcans) and a 
part of the quartier of Himbi, which remain the most urbanized, 
secure and wealthy parts of the city.
Independence in June 1960 was followed by a period of 
violence and instability. during the kanyarwanda War (1964–
1966), Goma experienced high levels of insecurity.2 the abolition 
of the residence permit—a colonial administrative mechanism 
aimed at controlling rural–urban migration—increased levels 
of insecrity in the countryside. Political instability in rwanda 
led to a rapid increase in the number of rwandans crossing the 
border, which resulted in rapid urbanization in Goma where 
many chose to stay.3
Between 1958 and 1970, Goma had an average annual growth of 
14 per cent, which was exceptional compared to other conglese 
cities at the time.4 Under President Mobutu sese seko (1965–1997), 
2   Bucyalimwe Mararo stanislas, ‘Le nord-kivu au coeur de La crise congolaise’, 
L’afrique des Grands Lacs 2001–2002 (2002). Paris: Harmattan, 2002.
3   karen Büscher, ‘conflict, state Failure and Urban transformation in the Eastern 
congolese Periphery’, Phd dissertation, Ghent University, Ghent, 2011, 60.
4   Büscher, ‘conflict, state Failure and Urban transformation’.
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a small Banyarwanda (mainly tutsi) elite gained considerable 
political and economic influence, and invested extensively in 
land and property. new neighbourhoods were developed and 
the construction of an international airport further boosted the 
regional importance of the city.5 
during the 1970s and 1980s, the city experienced an influx 
of people from Bukavu, for whom life in Goma seemed much 
cheaper and employment opportunities were greater—a trend 
that continues in 2019. Informal transborder trade further 
strengthened the urban politico-economic elite and reinforced 
the eastward orientation of the city.6 It was during this period 
that Goma evolved from a peripheral city into a major political 
and economic hub in the Great Lakes region.
the violence that marked the kivu provinces during the first 
half of the 1990s brought several waves of internally displaced 
persons (IdPs) and rwandan refugees to Goma, which increas-
ingly became the regional city of refuge. thousands of people 
fleeing the violence against Banyarwanda in Masisi and rutshuru 
territories settled on the city periphery, creating land conflicts 
with the existing local population.7 the security situation in the 
city deteriorated, including intensified recruitment efforts by 
the rwandan Patriotic Front, the tutsi-led rebel force fighting 
the Habyarimana regime in rwanda, which created tension and 
suspicion in the city.8 
the refugee crisis that resulted from the rwandan genocide 
5   anna Verhoeve: ‘conflict and the urban space: the socio-economic impact of 
conflict on the city of Goma’, in Conflict and Social Transformation in Eastern Congo, eds. 
koen Vlassenroot and tim raeymaekers, Ghent: academia Press, 2004, 103-122. 
6   Janet MacGaffey, Entrepreneurs and Parasites: The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in 
Zaire, cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1987; Mukohya Vwakyankazi, ‘Import 
and Export in the second Economy in north kivu’, in The Real Economy of Zaïre: The 
Contribution of Smuggling and Other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth, ed. Janet 
MacGaffey, Oxford: James currey, 1991, 43 – 71.
7   Mairie de Goma, ‘statistics annual report’, Goma: Mairie de Goma, 1993.
8   Mairie de Goma 1993; Mairie de Goma, ‘statistics annual report’, Goma: Mairie de 
Goma, 1994. 
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in 1994 brought an estimated one million—mainly Hutu—
rwandan refugees to eastern congo. the majority settled in 
refugee camps around Goma. these camps were the scene of a 
profound humanitarian disaster and the source of heavy milita-
rization and violence. these events completely destabilized the 
city for several months. at the same time, it was the start of the 
establishment of international humanitarian and development 
agencies in Goma, a trend which would evolve into one of the 
main industries in the city.
the rwandan refugee crisis formed the beginning of a long 
period of civil war, violence and forced displacement. Within this 
context, the city of Goma played a number of roles: it became a 
centre for recruitment, a rebel headquarters, a zone of refuge, a 
node in the political economy of war and the main deployment 
base for Un peacekeeping forces in the region. the influx of 
IdPs partly explains the doubling of the population in Goma 
over a span of ten years from 320,000 inhabitants in 1999 to an 
estimated 700,000 in 2009.9 
city of rebels
during the First congolese War (1996–1997), Goma became 
one of the leading military centres of Laurent-désiré kabila’s 
Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre 
(aFdL, alliance of democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
congo), which chased President Mobutu from power in 1997. 
the aFdL violently dismantled the refugee camps around Goma, 
raising tensions and increasing violence in the city. the war also 
catalysed an economic crisis and led to the considerable inflation 
of food prices.10 In addition, the war increased rwandan influence 
in Goma, which continued to grow during the second congolese 
9   Büscher, ‘conflict, state Failure’. 
10   Mairie de Goma, ‘statistics annual report’, Goma: Mairie de Goma, 1997.
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War (1998–2003), when the city became the major headquarters 
of the rwandan-backed Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie 
(rcd, congolese rally for democracy) rebellion. during the 
second congolese War, Goma became a rebel capital that was 
administratively and politically cut off from kinshasa and under 
the control of a military-economic elite.
despite the peace agreements in 2002, Goma did not shed its 
association with rebellion. In 2008, the city became the target 
of the Congrès national pour la défense du people (cndP, national 
congress for the defence of the People), a tutsi rebel movement 
led by Laurent nkunda. Between 2007 and 2013, fighting between 
the cndP—and later its successor, the Mouvement du 23 mars 
(M23, March 23 Movement)—and the congolese army resulted 
in numerous influxes of IdPs, who settled in several camps in 
the Goma’s peripheries.  For both the cndP and the M23, Goma 
functioned as an urban recruitment base and a safe haven, in 
which rebel leaders could circulate freely, invest in real estate, 
petrol and other businesses, and develop a steady taxation base.11
In november 2012, when the M23 briefly occupied Goma, its 
inhabitants experienced ten days of lootings and executions 
during which most economic activities ceased and people mostly 
stayed inside their homes. 
More than 25 years of violent conflict have had a significant 
social, political and economic impact on Goma and its inhabit-
ants. Increasing militarization also changed the geography of 
the city. a university student notes in 1999 how ‘in Goma, the 
airport had turned into a military base, bars into rebels’ meeting 
rooms, churches into conspiracy platforms and hotels into peace 
11   steward andrew scott, Laurent Nkunda et La Rébellion Du Kivu, Paris: karthala, 
2008; karen Büscher, ‘Urban Governance Beyond the state: Practices of Informal Urban 
regulation in the city of Goma, Eastern d.r. congo’, Urban Forum 23/4 (2012): 483–99.
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conference centres’.12 the city is now the main headquarters of 
the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en 
République démocrat-ique du Congo (MOnUscO, United nations 
Organization stabilization Mission in the democratic republic 
of the congo), which occupies large areas of the city. the 
presence of MOnUscO in Goma, however, has not prevented 
urban insecurity from being a permanent feature of everyday life.
Inter-ethnic dynamics
conflict dynamics have impacted inter-ethnic relations in the 
city. compared to its rural surroundings, Goma is a relatively 
cosmopolitan area, where various ethnic communities of the 
broader north and south kivu region are represented in the 
economy and in politics. However, identity politics and the 
political contestation between Banyarwanda (Hutu and tutsi) 
and autochthonous (Hunde, nande, tembo and nyanga, among 
others) populations are also manifest in Goma. 
When Goma functioned as the rcd rebel headquarters, the 
Banyarwanda political and economic elite was reinforced, control-
ling all main administrative posts and key economic sectors. Hutu 
still remain the ethnic majority in Goma (reinforced by the influx 
of refugees from rwanda and IdPs from Masisi and rutshuru) 
but their position of power in politics is being countered by the 
economic dominance of the nande.13 the historical position of 
the Banyarwanda during different episodes of war in the broader 
region has further fuelled the autochthony discourse in Goma. 
From business activities to churches and university student 
associations, this political dichotomy translates into different 
12   cécile kavira theza, ‘Impact des Guerres de Libération sur Le tourisme dans La 
Ville de Goma’, Ma dissertation, centre Universitaire de kisangani, Extension Goma, 
1999.
13   karen Büscher, ‘Urban Governance Beyond the state: Practices of Informal Urban 
regulation in the city of Goma, Eastern d.r. congo’, Urban Forum 23/4 (2012): 483–499.  
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levels of urban society. this has not, however, resulted in spatial 
ethnic enclaves in Goma. 
during times of violent conflict, Banyarwanda living in Goma 
are often suspected of collaboration with those rebel groups 
referred to as foreign aggressors, such as the M23 and the FdLr. 
In cases of urban violence, when the identity of the perpetrator 
is unknown, it is not uncommon to hear people speculate about 
them speaking kinyarwanda, the language of rwanda. Banyar-
wanda are also often accused, without evidence, in cases of 
kidnapping, which have been on the rise in recent years. despite 
this, there is no evidence that a particular ethnic group is more 
involved in urban crime in Goma than others. 
the connection between urban insecurity and the broader 
dynamics of violent conflict in the region is complex. drivers 
of insecurity are unique, as issues such as the relation between 
identity and territory play out in different ways in rural compared 
to urban contexts. the two types of violence are thus different, 
although specific dynamics, such as the circulation of arms and 
the failed reintegration of soldiers, reinforce urban insecurity. 
  
3. Experiences of Insecurity in Goma
In the eastern congo, aspects of the wider congolese urban 
context, including poverty, unemployment, exclusion, gentrifica-
tion, poor functioning of the state security forces and a general 
situation of impunity—examined in greater detail elsewhere14—
combine with the local context of ongoing violent conflict to 
create a uniquely insecure urban environment. conflicts in the 
eastern congo are characterized by militarization, the prolifera-
tion of armed groups and firearms (easily available to criminal 
networks),15 and the normalization of everyday violence. 
although war dynamics do not explain urban insecurity as 
such, they do, however, reinforce the violent nature of urban 
crime.16 this peaked in the early part of 2019 with a series of 
violent robberies, kidnappings and killings. One such example 
is described below: 
at 7 p.m. on 20 February 2019, a heavily pregnant young 
woman was in her kitchen in ndosho when four armed 
men entered her house. One of them was dressed in a 
police uniform, another in an army uniform and the two 
others wore civilian clothes. they handcuffed the young 
14   Usalama Project III focus group with association des jeunes, Goma, 1 april 2019; 
Usalama Project III interview  with civil society leader, Goma,, 22 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with leader of cLPd, Goma, 29 March 2019. Filip de Boeck and 
sammy Baloji, Suturing the City: Living Together in Congo’s Urban Worlds, London: autograph, 
2016; theodore trefon, Reinventing Order in the Congo: How People Respond to State Failure in 
Kinshasa, London; new York; kampala, Uganda: Zed Books Ltd, 2004.
15   Usalama Project III interview with leader of cLdP, Goma, 29 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with civil society leader, Goma, 25 March 2019; Usalama Project 
III focus group with association des jeunes, Goma, 1 april 2019. Police and army forces, 
sometimes assisted by MOnUscO regularly organize actions in urban neighbourhoods 
to search and collect illegally held weapons, but because of complicity between police 
forces and criminals, these actions are often only partly successful. alexis Bouvy, ‘nous 
n’avons que nos yeux pour pleurer: Protection, insécurité et criminalité dans la ville de 
Goma, nord kivu’, Oxfam GB, 2014 (unpublished).
16   Büscher, ‘conflict, state Failure’.
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woman and asked for her money and phone. Because she 
was handcuffed, one of her children gave the phone to 
the armed robbers, while she told them where they could 
find Usd 300 hidden in her bedroom. she was then taken 
outside. the armed men then announced that she was 
being kidnapped for a ransom of Usd 10,000, which would 
be demanded from her husband. 
after leaving the house with the young woman in tow, 
the four armed men then began shooting at random. they 
also went into houses and shops, and stole money and 
phones from passers-by. they stopped an elderly man 
and his wife on the street, asked why they were leaving in 
such a rush and then abruptly shot the wife dead. While 
kidnapping another girl in a nearby house, the criminals 
also killed her brother because he had tried to intervene. a 
man transporting charcoal likewise was summarily shot. In 
total, six people were killed and twelve kidnapped. 
the young woman and the other kidnap victims 
were taken to Virunga national Park. subsequently, the 
kidnappers took pity on the young woman because of her 
pregnancy and released her. the other kidnapped women 
were less fortunate. all of them were raped. In the end, 
the kidnap victims were all released after a ransom of 
Usd 7,500 was paid. When asked if she thought this was 
a targeted killing, the young woman said in her opinion 
this was not the case because of the random nature of 
their violence and theft. she further indicated that the 
perpetrators were all young and spoke kinyarwanda.17 
the high level of violence and number of victims shocked 
people in ndosho and Goma in general. the event also involved 
a number of forms of violence, including kidnapping, robbery, 
killing and rape. the perpetrators were allegedly kinyar-
wanda-speaking and wore state security uniforms, a common 
17   Usalama Project III interview with female resident, Goma, 3 april 2019.
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description that fits the narrative of foreign and state complicity. 
the victims being taken into Virunga national Park also fuelled 
the hypothesis of the involvement of armed groups. the event 
also highlights the often indiscriminate nature of urban violence 
and, in this case, the specific targeting of women.
While the victims of urban crime represent a cross-section of 
the population in the city, there is a clear socio-economic divide 
in terms of susceptibility to urban crime. the poor generally have 
less protection from patronage networks, no vehicles to drive 
their children to school and limited access to housing in secure 
neighbourhoods. Women, who often work as market vendors, 
mobile traders or in bars and restaurants, are also more exposed 
to everyday forms of urban insecurity, such as robberies and 
harassment. 
neighbourhoods of insecurity
From the start of 2019, the deadliest criminal incidents were 
concentrated in the neighbourhoods of ndosho, Mugunga (the 
focus of this report)18 in karisimbi commune on the western 
periphery of Goma and Majengo, a neighbourhood in the eastern 
periphery of karisimbi. twenty years ago, ndosho was a sparsely 
inhabited peri-urban space, whereas at present it is situated in 
the midst of the city—a densely populated neighbourhood with 
myriad economic activities. ndosho is known for its vibrant 
markets but also its maisons de tolérance (brothels) and high levels 
of crime. It has a diverse ethnic composition with a Hutu majority 
but is also inhabited by many nande, shi, Hunde, tembo, tutsi 
and others. ndosho is characterized by high levels of inequality, 
which are visible in urban architectural disparities—from shacks 
18   a recently published report based on a quantitative survey has confirmed these 
neighbourhoods to be the most insecure of Goma. Pole Institute, “Problematique de la 
recrudescence de l’insécurité dans la commune de karisimbi”, Goma: Pole Institute, 2018.
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to multi-story houses—in adjacent areas.  
Mugunga, which is adjacent to ndosho to the west, is a typical 
peri-urban space where rural and urban forms of administration, 
livelihoods, actors and identities merge. the neighbourhood 
inhabitants are mainly Hutu but several other ethnic communi-
ties are also present. Mugunga is known for having been the 
location of several large refugee camps in the aftermath of the 1994 
rwandan genocide, as well as large IdP camps during periods of 
intense fighting between the cndP (and later M23) and the Forces 
Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Fardc, armed 
Forces of the democratic republic of the congo) in 2008–2010 
and 2012–2013. although the camps have been dismantled, the 
neighbourhood is characterized by a high number of former IdPs 
(Hunde and Hutu) who settled in Mugunga. Moreover, youth 
and former IdPs feel insecure due to stereotypes, such as being 
victims of insecurity but also being alleged to be involved in 
insecurity. For example, a group of former IdPs explained how 
they are sometimes ‘seen as terrorists, because originating from 
those zones where the rebels operate.’19
Both ndosho and Mugunga border Virunga national Park to 
the north and the main road to sake to the south, dividing the 
Goma and karisimbi communes. during the day, most of the 
mobility and commercial activities are centred around this main 
road, at different axes or junctions where markets or transport 
stations are located. Many inhabitants of Mugunga, including 
bandits and maibobo (street children), spend the day in ndosho, 
which offers more commercial opportunities. When people 
talk about insecurity in their neighbourhood, they make a clear 
distinction between day and night. ndosho by night is different 
from ndosho by day. during the day, experiences of insecurity 
are centred around pickpocketing and extortion by maibobo, 
19   Usalama Project III mental mapping exercise with IdPs, Goma, 11 april 2019.
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harassment by gangs and intimidation by security forces.20 these 
types of insecurity have become a systematic part of everyday 
life in Goma. Banditry and petty crime have become a liveli-
hood for many and are part of an urban economy of survival 
and enrichment. stolen goods are openly sold in the markets, 
many criminals are known in the neighbourhood and some gang 
leaders are well-known throughout the city. 
security after dark
at night, security dynamics deteriorate and insecurity takes 
more violent forms. Most residents return home, while gangs 
and (mixed) patrols of Police nationale congolaise (Pnc, congolese 
national Police) and police militaire (PM, military police) units 
move through the streets. With empty streets and the cover 
of darkness, it becomes easier for bandits, thieves, police and 
military officers with bad intentions to operate. as a shopkeeper 
in ndosho explains: 
We do not walk the streets during the night. after 7 p.m., 
it is the police and the military that walk the streets. If you 
do not have your voter registration card, they take your 
money and phone. If you do have your card on you, they 
ask for cigarettes. If you can’t give them something, your 
phone is gone. Especially when they are already drunk. … 
Or they just beat you.21 
a congolese researcher and nGO staff member adds, ‘What 
strikes me is how we leave them all this room during the night, 
since no one except bandits can be found on the streets. … the 
20   as a vibrant economic neighbourhood, ndosho, with places such as station 
simba, terminus, nyabushongo and cajed, experiences higher levels of petty crime than 
Mugunga. Except for the commercial axis of amour and the market of kanyarushinya, 
Mugunga is a relatively calm neighbourhood during the day.
21   Interview with shopkeeper, Goma, 4 april 2016. 
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higher we build our walls, the more incapable we are to leave 
our house.’22 at night, even a motard (motorcycle taxi driver) 
can transform into a bandit. an inhabitant of ndosho explains: 
since it was after dark, the motard refused to drop me off 
at home, which is inside the neighbourhood and left me at 
the school of kigogo in ndosho. When I offered him the 
cdF 3,000 (Usd 1.80) we agreed upon, the driver refused, 
asking cdF 5,000 (Usd 3) instead. We started to argue, 
and the driver started to fight and robbed me of everything 
I had on me— my laptop, telephone, hard disc, passport 
and work documents. While beating me, the driver 
shouted, ‘thief! thief! this guy is stealing my motorcycle.’ 
the neighbours started to appear, armed with sticks and 
chevrons, looking for a car tire to burn me.23
the respondent managed to escape but when he went to the 
nearby police station to file a complaint, he was asked for Usd 
50 to open an investigation. discouraged, he decided to drop it. 
He adds, ‘there, where I reside, they think I have money. But 
I have nothing. If I find some means, I will move out of this 
neighbourhood.’24 
Gang activities also intensify at night, with gangs robbing 
passers-by of their money, phones and other valuables. as 
one gang leader asserts, ‘It is on the streets at night where 
there is a lot of money. … I do not lack a telephone. I am a 
businessman. they call me. there is someone who is coming. 
… there is something in his backpack. I will know how to take 
that money.’25 at times, he argues, they collaborate and do coops 
(from cooperate, meaning to do deals) with officers of the Pnc or 
Fardc. He goes on the explain: ‘I tell him [the Pnc or Fardc 
22   Usalama Project III interview with congolese researcher, Goma, 26 March 2019.
23   Usalama Project III interview with resident, Goma, 15 april 2019.
24   Usalama Project III interview with resident, Goma, 15 april 2019.
25   Usalama Project III interview with gang leader, 5 april 2019.
26 insecurity in goma
officer] we are going to do that and that and that [a particular 
type of criminal activity]. He is then going to secure the place 
where we will operate. afterwards everyone gets their share.’26
Other gangs and groups of alleged Pnc and Fardc units 
rob peoples’ homes at night. In March 2019, a gang of unarmed 
robbers entered a house in ndosho. Using a car jack to open 
the door, they shouted: ‘Mon capitaine, beta makasi’ [captain, 
shoot!] to give the impression that they were armed soldiers. 
Once inside, the thieves looted the place, making a human chain 
to pass valuables out of the house.27 
robberies at night are cited as one of the main forms of night-
time insecurity in ndosho and Mugunga. this form of insecurity 
has become very common and people can be victims on multiple 
occasions. In contrast to the case above, where criminals only 
pretend to have weapons, in other cases, the criminals are armed. 
as one victim of an armed robbery describes:
the bandits entered in masses. they were very many. I 
was sleeping downstairs with my wife and the baby. they 
entered the front door by shooting through it. We fled 
our room to take the stairs to go inside. downstairs, they 
forced one of our daughters to show them the rooms 
upstairs. We locked ourselves in the room. the bandits 
shot through the door, hurting our baby, right above her 
eye and in her arm. We fled to the shower. the baby was 
bleeding very much. they came in and I started to give 
them everything they wanted from us. that night, I had 
prepared for my travel to Benin the day after. My luggage 
was all packed. they took it all. It was very traumatizing. 
My wife, who was pregnant, gave birth too early but the 
baby is more or less ok. While locked in the bathroom, I 
called the chef de quartier and the colonel I know but they 
26   Usalama Project III interview with gang leader, 5 april 2019.
27   Usalama Project III focus group with three woman and chef d’avenue, Goma, 27 
March 2019.
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started to talk about fuel, [more specifically, the lack of 
fuel, which prevented them from intervening] so no one 
came to help.28 
targeted attacks
Fardc and Pnc personnel can transform into criminals at 
night, too. a victim of a robbery explains how soldiers looted his 
house while he and his wife attended a wedding. their son, who 
was home at the time, was tied to the bed. the next day, the son 
encountered a maibobo selling their stolen solar panel battery on 
the streets, suggesting collaboration between soldiers, maibobo 
and gangs.29 these armed robberies are often said to be targeted 
cases, as the incidents above suggest. this means that victims 
are selected beforehand, often because of supposed money or 
valuables in their possession. during these robberies, bandits 
can easily kill people on the spot. 
another form of deadly incidents are règlement de comptes 
(French; score settling), where people are targeted to be 
murdered or kidnapped due to a variety of conflicts, such as 
land or economic conflicts, family disputes and political contes-
tations. as a resident of Mugunga puts it: ‘there is no effect 
without a cause. to kill someone. there are roots somewhere.’30 
In other words, people get murdered for a reason. not all victims 
are targeted, however. Many are collateral damage or, in the 
words of some interviewees, they are known as ‘figurants’.31 In 
these cases, bandits seek to sow confusion about who the real 
target is, erase their traces and get rid of possible witnesses.32 
28   Usalama Project III interview with nGO staff member, Goma, 13 april 2019.
29   Usalama Project III interview with victim of robbery, Goma, 27 March 2019.
30   Usalama Project III interview with resident, Goma, 28 March 2019.
31   Usalama Project III focus group with association des jeunes, Goma, 1 april 2019.
32   Usalama Project III interview with resident, ndosho, Goma, 3 april 2019; Interview 
with resident Mugunga, Goma, 6 april 2019.
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the following story is illustrative in this regard. On 16 
February 2019, a group of armed bandits in civilian clothes raided 
Mugunga, entering the neighbourhood from Virunga national 
Park. they went straight to the house of a pastor and community 
leader known as tumaini, who was not home. they forced a 
neighbour to call him in order to locate him and once they found 
him, they immediately executed him.33 during this operation, 
which lasted no more than an hour, the bandits killed six people 
(including an Fardc lieutenant) and two more on their way 
back towards the park, leaving a total of eight dead.34 One of the 
figurants was killed next to a school complex in which hundreds 
of Pnc officers of the Groupe mobile d’intervention (GMI, Mobile 
Group of Intervention) are stationed.35 
trying to understand why the pastor was targeted, an inter-
viewee stresses: ‘there were no suspicions that Mr tumaini 
collaborated with the FdLr or other culprits.’ the pastor was a 
leader of a committee defending the rights of people that were 
under threat of being relocated from a plot of land in Mugunga, 
which was of interest to a cigarette company. ‘after his death, 
they [land surveyors] came to the site of the subdivision for the 
land in those streets where he exercised his leadership. so, we 
can say that the death of the pastor is due to land conflict.’36 
In another case, on 29 February 2019, six armed bandits—
some in civilian clothes; some in military uniforms—attacked 
the commercial hotspot in Mugunga, amour, and killed a woman 
who owned a shop. she was in conflict over money with her 
family-in-law, who accused her of witchcraft and intoxicating 
her husband. Earlier, she had already faced three other attacks 
by armed bandits. Her husband, who was in the shop with 
33   Usalama Project III interview with widow, Goma, 6 april 2019. 
34   Usalama Project III interview with chef de quartier of Mugunga, Goma, 26 March 
2019.
35   Usalama Project III interview with shopkeeper, Goma, 3 april 2019.
36   Usalama Project III interview with resident of Mugunga, Goma, 4 april 2019. 
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her that day, was also killed.37 In this case as well, the bandits 
looted, killed and wounded people they encountered on their 
way. In total, six people were killed and around twenty others 
wounded.38 commenting on the case, a resident of Mugunga 
asserts: ‘note that the sous-cIat [lowest level police station] 
is located only a few metres from where the incident occurred, 
and Fardc soldiers are in the vicinity. But curiously, there was 
no intervention. Let’s not even talk about an investigation.’39 
shortly afterwards, the only police officer present at the station 
explained that the station is limited to two police officers, which 
is clearly insufficient in terms of capacity to defend nearby inhab-
itants against attacks by groups of armed robbers.40 
shifting security dynamics
Levels of violence, insecurity and crime in Goma fluctuate over 
time and within different parts of the city. Often an increase 
in urban insecurity occurs during periods of political unrest 
or fighting in the city’s hinterlands. a rise in violent armed 
robberies was noted during the cndP war in 2008. after the 
deployment of special units of the PM in 2009—the organization 
of mixed patrols with MOnUscO—and the re-establishment of 
public street lightning, robberies declined.41
there was a similar peak during the M23 military campaign 
in 2012 when new forms of urban crime, including kidnappings, 
emerged. From 2015 onwards, kidnappings in Goma and the wider 
37   Usalama Project III interview with relative of victim, Goma, 3 april 2019.
38   Esther nsapu, ‘rdc: Une Fusillade Fait 6 Morts à Goma’, La Libre Afrique, 13 
september 2018. accessed 25 June 2019, https://afrique.lalibre.be/18584/rdc-une-fusillade-
fait-6-morts-a-goma.
39   Usalama Project III interview with resident, Goma, 3 april 2019.
40   Usalama Project III interview with Pnc officer, Goma, 6 april 2019.
41   timothée Butwali Mabingo, ‘raisons de La Persistance des cas d’assassinats dans 
La Ville de Goma de 2004 à 2008, Goma: University of Goma 2008; Pole Institute, ‘Est de 
La rdc: Le crime Banalisé’, Goma: regards croisés, 2009.
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region steadily increased, with victims mainly being children 
who are seen as easy targets as well as bringing high ransom 
payments.42 since the end of 2018, more violent forms of urban 
crime have been on the rise, caused by a complex interaction of 
local and regional political, economic and military dynamics. a 
fall in the exchange rate from cdF 900 to cdF 1,600 as equiva-
lent to Usd 1 over the past three years has led to an economic 
crisis at the household level, as well as drastically reducing the 
salaries of security personnel. In both cases, individuals are 
being pushed to ‘find a living in a different manner’.43 
the lead up to the 2018 national elections, held on december 
30, 2018, including the release of prisoners by presidential 
pardon and the increased mobilization of security forces, was 
highlighted as a period of increased urban insecurity and crime.44 
the immediate post-election period was also characterized by 
confusion and a lack of clarity around local power structures.45 It 
took five months for a new provincial governor to be elected and 
several military hierarchies had shifted, impacting on patronage 
networks. People refer to the current situation of ‘extreme polit-
ical fragility’ as giving a ‘freeway’ to ‘those who want to attack’.46 
the dynamics of urban insecurity are also often closely 
42   John Emerson, ‘dr congo: kidnappings skyrocket in the East’, new York: 
Human rights Watch, 16 december 2015. accessed 26 June 2019, https://www.hrw.
org/news/2015/12/16/dr-congo-kidnappings-skyrocket-east; ‘a Goma, trop d’enfants 
disparaissent!’, Habari DRC, 19 Mai 2019. accessed 26 June 2019, https://habarirdc.net/a-
goma-trop-denfants-disparaissent. Mubalama, Passy. ‘kidnapping à Goma: «Les Enfants, 
Une nouvelle cible des ravisseurs»’, rift Valley Institute, 29 april 2019. accessed 26 
June 2019, http://riftvalley.net/news/kidnapping-a-goma) 
43   Usalama Project III interview with member of La Lucha, Goma, 12 april 2019; 
Usalama Project III interview with security manager of international nGO, Goma, 10 
april 2019. 
44   Usalama Project III focus group with association des jeunes, Goma, 1 april 2019; 
Usalama Project III interview with leader of civil society, Goma 22 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with leader of Cellule pour le développement, Goma, 29 March 2019.
45   Usalama Project III interview with congolese researcher, Goma, 26 March 2019.
46   Usalama Project III interview with chef de quartier, Goma, 26 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with chef de quartier adjoint, Goma, 26 March 2019.
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connected to particular kinds of spaces, such as roads, densely 
populated residential areas, markets, schools, petrol stations, 
banks and security headquarters. during a mapping exercise, 
where respondents were asked to identify places of insecurity 
(zones rouge or red zones) in their neighbourhood, they often 
identified places where people had been killed. 
the ndosho and Mugunga maps show a large number of these 
red zones. the northern border of the neighbourhoods with 
Virunga national Park were marked on all maps as one red line, 
which some referred to as le bain du sang (French; bloodbath). 
People use the spatial category of points chauds (French; hotspots) 
when talking about their experiences of urban insecurity. For 
example, the residences of some senior Fardc officers are 
identified as places to be avoided at night because of alleged 
extortion by their personal guards.47 commercial hotspots, such 
as simba petrol station in ndosho, are explicitly connected to 
gang activity. 
In the Mugunga neighbourhood, a place called kanyarutchinya 
is seen as the main red zone due to the concentration of gangs, 
FdLr scouts and security forces.48 spatial connections of insecu-
rity are further illustrated by a youth from Mugunga: 
In our neighbourhood there are several firearms hidden in 
houses… we have already witnessed more than five arrests 
of persons in possession of weapons collaborating with the 
resident bandits in the nyiragongo [nyiragongo territory 
or the park]. this confirms that they operate in networks. 
the sellers of firewood are satellites of the people who live 
in the park. You can often find them [the people from the 
47   Usalama Project III focus group discussion with IdPs, Goma, 11 april 2019. 
48   Usalama Project III mental mapping exercise with IdPs, Goma, 11 april 2019; 
Usalama Project III mental mapping exercise with youth, Goma, 11 april 2019; Pole 
Institute, ‘Problematique de la recrudescence de l’insécurité dans la commune de 
karisimbi’, Goma: Pole Institute, 2018.
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park] at the market of kanyarutchinya.49 
an important spatial representation of violence and insecurity 
are the maisons de tolérance. these consist of private houses in 
which prostitution is organized and alcohol and drugs can be 
consumed. they have the reputation as places where criminal 
deals are made and nodes in the circulation of arms. Interviewees 
identify them as yellow zones: places that are insecure but have 
no deadly violence.50 during mapping exercises with commu-
nity members, these zones are indicated as hotspots of daytime 
insecurity. during focus group discussions, mothers refer to the 
maisons de tolérance as a risk for their children, potentially drawing 
them into criminality.51 Youth mention how they are sometimes 
falsely accused of association with maisons de tolérance,52 indicating 
how urban crime sometimes affects the perception of youth. 
spaces of insecurity inside the neighbourhood can be connected 
to those outside the city through criminal networks. a mother 
in ndosho describes the story of her son, who disappeared for 
two years:
When he was sixteen years old, he started to pass his time 
in some of the maisons de tolérance. One day, he disappeared 
only to return two years later. He explained how in one of 
these houses, he had been recruited by a retired colonel, 
who took him outside of the city into the nyiragongo 
territory, to a large compound. several young boys were 
kept imprisoned there, being fed and trained and forced 
to go and steal during daytime in Goma. they had to pay 
a daily fee to the colonel and failing to do so resulted in 
threats of their family members being hurt. When my son 
escaped and returned home, I had nowhere to go, I was too 
49   Usalama Project III focus group with youth, Goma, 1 april 2019.
50   Usalama Project III mental mapping exercise with female traders, Goma, 9 april 
2019.
51   Usalama Project III focus group with female traders, Goma, 9 april 2019.
52   Usalama Project III focus group with school children, Goma, 9 april 2019.
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scared of repercussions to go and report to the police.53
another dimension of insecurity is the proximity of Virunga 
national Park—the operational ground of several armed 
actors54—which is seen by Goma’s residents as a threat to its 
outer neighbourhoods. On 9 april 2019, three stone vendors 
were kidnapped from the kanyarutchinya market, and the places 
where some of their clothes were found indicated that they were 
taken outside of the city and into the park.55 One member of the 
Mugunga youth association explains that this kind of kidnapping 
often occurs: ‘the FdLr just takes people with them to help 
transport goods for them to the park. after a couple of days, they 
are often released without a ransom being asked.’56 
some places also physically represent the connection between 
the park and the city, such as a hill referred to as colline de Kabila, 
where the Fardc used to have a strategic base. several cases 
of kidnappings have occurred in the direct vicinity of the hill, 
which criminals and kidnappers from the park must pass by.57 
People refer to the hill as a champs de bataille (French; battlefield) 
and the most dangerous place in the Mugunga neighbourhood. 
It is often where victims are found.58 
Especially in periods of tension and violence, the park has 
become a symbol for what Goma’s residents call outside or 
foreign violence and violent actors. It has become linked to the 
presence of armed groups such as the FdLr, which in Goma is 
commonly referred to as a foreign—rwandan—aggressor. some 
53   Usalama Project III focus group with female traders, Goma, 9 april 2019.
54   Esther Marijnen and Judith Verweijen, ‘Pluralising Political Forests: Unpacking “the 
state” by tracing Virunga’s charcoal chain’, Antipode (2018): 1–22, 8.
55   Usalama Project III interview with member of the Association de jeunes, Goma, 11 
april 2019.
56   Usalama Project III interview with member of the Association de jeunes, Goma, 11 
april 2019.
57   Usalama Project III interview with president of the Association de jeunes, Goma, 12 
april 2019; Usalama Project III mental mapping exercice with IdPs, Goma, 11 april 2019.
58   Usalama Project III focus group with IdPs, Goma, 11 april 2019.
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residents propose building a wall at the northern frontiers of the 
city to close it off from the park. 
4. Who are the (In)security actors in Goma? 
Identifying the main actors involved in urban insecurity can 
be a difficult task. residents accuse a multitude of actors of 
sowing insecurity in Goma, including maibobo, gangs, bandits, 
the security services, escaped prisoners, infiltrés (rebels or former 
rebels from armed groups) and démob (referring to demobilized 
soldiers). Often, the perpetrators of killings, kidnappings and 
armed robberies remain unidentified. nevertheless, a number of 
general tendencies are evident in the city.59 First, urban insecurity 
actors are a diverse group: state and non-state actors; civilians 
and military or security personnel. second, and related, security 
actors can simultaneously be responsible for insecurity.
Blaming the FdLr 
the FdLr is a rwandan Hutu rebel group that has been operating 
in the eastern drc for more than 15 years. It has become an 
integral part of the complex armed group constellation in north 
and south kivu,  playing an important role in different violent 
insurgencies. 60 Like other armed groups, the FdLr is not visibly 
present, but it is commonly accepted by Goma’s inhabitants that 
they operate in an indirect way, through infiltration in political, 
economic and social networks. the FdLr are often accused of 
committing violent crimes in the city. the account below, for 
example, is a common view held by Goma residents regarding 
FdLr activities:
the rebels come and operate here. they finance many 
59   alexis Bouvy, ‘nous n’avons que nos yeux pour pleurer’; Büscher, ‘conflict, state 
Failure’.
60   Jason stearns and christoph Vogel, ‘the Landscape of armed Groups in the Eastern 
congo’, new York: center on International cooperation, 2015. 
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[economic] activities: buses, trucks, motorcycles, shops, 
wood planks, charcoal. Many of the shops at amour [the 
main road running through Mugunga] work to the account 
of the FdLr, and pay the FdLr since they work with their 
money [traders have financial depts with the FdLr and 
pay them a form of tax in return]. Once you are dishonest, 
if you scorn them, or when you do not honour the 
agreement… they come after you and even your family. 
But when you follow their conventions, they are not bad. 
You make a living. You need to do things right when you 
work with them.61 
the complex relations between armed groups and urban 
economic markets is well known to urban inhabitants.62 In 
cases of murders and kidnappings, explanations are often sought 
through victims' involvement in military-economic relations. For 
example, on 2 March 2019, five people were killed in ndosho—a 
pharmacist and his client, a phone credit seller, a motorcycle 
taxi driver and a merchant. the pharmacist’s neighbour was 
kidnapped and his wife paid a ransom of Usd 2,500 in order to 
liberate him. It is assumed that he was kidnapped by the FdLr 
to settle a score because he was engaged in the mineral business 
in Walikale, a territory more than 200 km away from Goma, to 
the west. One interviewee indicates that he suspected him of 
collaborating with cheka Mai Mai units, which are in conflict 
with the FdLr.63 
the narrative of the FdLr as perpetrator is also being repro-
duced in the political domain. For example, some of the provincial 
opposition deputies have openly expressed their suspicions of 
collaboration between specific army officers and armed groups 
61   Usalama Project III interview with resident, Goma, 28 March 2019. 
62   scott, Laurent Nkunda et La Rébellion Du Kivu; Büscher, ‘Urban Governance Beyond the 
state’.
63   Usalama Project III interview with resident, Goma, 3 april 2019.
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in organizing urban insecurity.64 the mayor of Goma, timothée 
Mwisa, also accused ‘certain politicians’ of collaborating with 
armed groups to terrorize the urban population.65 these accusa-
tions followed a press release in which a provincial deputy 
demanded that the mayor resign due to his inability to handle 
the worsening security situation.66 Pointing at the FdLr as being 
responsible for insecurity in Goma thus offers the mayor a way 
to mask his own failures of urban governance and the provision 
of security and protection, and even, according to some, to hide 
his own complicity in the violence.67 
this interpretation resonates with similar findings on narra-
tives about the allied democratic Forces (adF), a rebel group 
active in the congo and Uganda, established to further specific 
political objectives. For example, by framing adF as a terrorist 
organization, the Uganda government to legitimize invading the 
drc, to attract military support from the Usa in the ‘global war 
on terror’ and to slander opposition politicians. 68  
narratives of FdLr implication in urban insecurity in Goma 
is strongly connected to the reputation of the city as an entry 
point of foreign aggressors. as mentioned earlier, violence is 
often ascribed to foreign actors, thereby denying the role of local 
64   sonia rolley, ‘rdc: des députés du nord-kivu s’inquiètent d’une Hausse 
de l’insécurité’, RFI Afrique, 3 March 2019. accessed 26 June 2019, http://www.rfi.fr/
afrique/20190303-rdc-deputes-nord-kivu-s-inquietent-hausse-insecurite.
65   Ivonne kapinga, ‘tueries à Goma: Le maire de la ville accuse “certains politiciens et 
des enfants de connivence avec les groupes armés’, Actualité CD, 6 March 2019. accessed 
26 June 2019, https://actualite.cd/2019/03/06/tueries-goma-le-maire-de-la-ville-accuse-
certains-politiciens-et-des-enfants-de.
66   Gisèle Mbuyi, ‘tuerie à Goma dans le nord-kivu : 6 personnes abattues et une 
enlevée par des présumées FdLr’, Digital Congo, 4 Mars 2019. accessed 25 June 2019, 
https://digitalcongo.net/article/5c7d191d90e7320004c53a88/
67   Usalama Project III interview with member of La Lucha, Goma 12 april 2019; 
Usalama Project III interview with congolese researcher, Goma, 26 March 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with congolese researcher, Goma, 13 april 2019.
68   kristof titeca and daniel Fahey, ‘the Many Faces of a rebel Group: the allied 
democratic Forces in the democratic republic of congo’, International Affairs 92/5 (2016), 
1189–1206.
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actors and obscuring local dynamics. the crucial role of local 
actors, processes and dynamics cannot be ignored, however. the 
role of local actors in insecurity in Goma is demonstrated in the 
accounts of arrested offenders, who turn out to be locally based 
Gomatraciens (inhabitants of Goma). In fact, many respondents 
claim that the FdLr narrative is used by all kinds of local bandits 
as a pretext to make people believe they operate for the FdLr by 
using escape routes via the park. a Pnc officer explains:
the FdLr is a pretext that we put forward. But in reality, 
it is a fact that most congolese are unemployed, which 
is the problem. Bandits operate and vanish directly. the 
park is far! … Because of unemployment, people need to 
fend for themselves in other ways. … after bandits come 
and operate, people say, ‘ah, it is the FdLr. they spoke 
kinyarwanda.’ But most people here speak kinyarwanda.69 
another Pnc officer adds: ‘Pointing the finger at the FdLr? 
But no, there are also police officers who do that [killing, robbing, 
kidnapping]. Even soldiers [Fardc]. there is no follow up.’70
the varied perceptions of FdLr involvement in urban insecu-
rity demand a more nuanced analysis. What becomes clear 
upon closer inspection is that the FdLr narrative seems to be 
an oversimplification. In the cases of urban insecurity that are 
documented, local and external actors closely interact. apart 
from the key role the FdLr play in the wood and charcoal trade, 
local conflicts are equally important to the dynamics of insecurity 
and violence in Goma. Moreover, the FdLr narrative has been 
politicized and serves several different agendas, with violence 
in ndosho and Mugunga reinforcing suspicions about who is in 
collaboration with this armed group.71 
69   Usalama Project III focus group with Pnc officers, Goma, 15 april 2019.
70   Usalama Project III focus group with Pnc officers, Goma, 15 april 2019.
71   Usalama Project III focus group with female traders, Goma, 9 april 2019.
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Involvement of state authorities 
there is a general consensus among Goma inhabitants that the 
state authorities are complicit in urban insecurity. respondents 
claim that the state security services harass, extort and rob the 
inhabitants of the city, often in conjunction with maibobo, gangs 
and other culprits.72 the high levels of kidnappings, killings and 
robberies, combined with continued impunity, have led to a 
deterioration of the relationship between the residents of Goma 
and the state authorities. 
For many residents in Goma, recent violent criminal incidents 
are seen as part of an overall plan that aims to use insecurity to 
push opportunist political agendas. this sentiment is reinforced 
whenever Pnc, Fardc or Agence Nationale de Renseignements 
(anr, national Intelligence agency) units are caught involved 
in crime. For example, on 30 March 2019, a military intelligence 
officer was caught in Mugunga selling two firearms to FdLr 
rebels.73 this story spread like wildfire, fuelling suspicions of 
the complicity of state security actors—and politicians—in the 
current increase in violence. a popular television comedy sketch 
reflects these popular suspicions: based on a true story of an 
armed robbery, the sketch shows a man being visited at his house 
by a group of armed bandits. When a family member watching 
from behind a cupboard calls the numéro vert (the emergency 
police number), the mobile phones of the armed thieves start 
to ring.74 such perceptions are further inflamed by the figure of 
homme armé non autrement identifié (French; unidentified armed 
man), who appears in the media and popular narratives as the 
main perpetrator of violence in the city. despite not being identi-
fiable, discussions often circulate around whether they were 
72   Usalama Project III mental mapping exercise with youth, Goma, 9 april 2019; 
Usalama Project III mental mapping exercise motorcycle taxi drivers, Goma, 11 april 2019.
73   Usalama Project III interview with bourgmestre, Goma, 4 april 2019.
74   Usalama Project III interview with president of local nGO, Goma, 13 april 2019.
40 insecurity in goma
seen wearing a Pnc or Fardc uniform. 
the passivity and inaction by the Pnc, Fardc and anr—
perceived as doing nothing to stop rising levels of insecurity and 
violence—also strengthens perceptions of complicity. contrary 
to these negative public perceptions, police units stress that 
their stations at the neighbourhood level, especially the lowest 
level Pnc stations, the sous-cIats or sous-commissariats, are 
under-resourced and understaffed, with only a handful of police 
officers. Both ndosho and Mugunga have one commissariat (cIat; 
police station) attached to the office of the chef de quartier and 
three sous-commissariats (sous-cIat) spread over each neighbour-
hood. this lack of resources is verified by the research team, who 
observed that one of the three sous-cIats in Mugunga had only 
two police officers on duty and a single firearm.75 
While the question of whether the security services are 
complicit in recent attacks remains open, there is certainly some 
truth in the shared complaints by people in Goma that bandits 
and gangs collaborate with and are protected by the state author-
ities. denouncing a criminal, for example, can be a dangerous 
undertaking: after having been arrested, suspected perpetrators 
often find themselves back on the streets in short order, often 
aware of who denounced them. For a share of the profits derived 
from criminal activities or payment of a negotiated fine, thieves 
and other criminals are quickly released from police detention. 
a Pnc officer asserts, ‘We police officers are transformed into 
judges because if we transfer cases to the parquet (prosecutor’s 
office), we do not eat.’76 
sometimes, orders to release criminals or to hold back from 
prosecution come from above. a police officer explains, ‘Lots 
of bandits are known by the executives [les cadres]. they go to 
Munzenze [the central prison in Goma], only pretending. after 
75   Usalama Project III observation, Goma, 6 april 2019. 
76   Usalama Project III focus group with Pnc officers, Goma, 15 april 2019.
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two weeks, they are out.’77 a commander from another police 
station elaborates: 
One day I arrested someone with counterfeit money. Later, 
he even confessed that he kidnapped people. I wanted to 
transfer him to the parquet but I got into trouble with the 
superior prosecutor. a prosecutor came to my station and 
said, ‘not all meat is edible.’ He wanted me to release him 
without conditions. so, what should I do? … I released 
him. the prosecutor is the prosecutor. If I continued, 
he would pursue me. Besides, the criminal association 
remains operative here. so, I should be careful. Our congo 
is in total failure.78 
Patronage and protection
to understand how patronage and protection networks function 
between state authorities and criminals, it is important to recog-
nize that they depend on one another. Gangs need patrons for 
their protection and the state authorities often seek clients to 
provide them with money and inside information. Furthermore, 
on some occasions, such as the anti-kabila protests in the run-up 
to the 2018 elections, Pnc officials deployed gangs to help break 
up these protests.79 
From their perspective, as a police officer explains, ‘Bandits 
like to work with the authorities here. Even here in our [police] 
station. they come by . . .  “ah vieux [old man]!80 It is you that 
they sent here.” We are the youngsters of this neighbourhood. … 
77   Usalama Project III focus group with Pnc officers, Goma, 15 april 2019.
78   Usalama Project III interview with Pnc commander, Goma, 2 april 2019.
79   Interview with gang leader, Goma, 15 July 2017.
80   Literally, the French word ‘vieux’ translates to ‘old man’ but in this context it refers 
respectfully to an elder or superior. 
42 insecurity in goma
they want to familiarize themselves with us.’81 a gang member 
elaborates:
If we go to virgin ground, first we visit the chef of that 
place. We try to meet the highest officer of the army or 
police. [We say], ‘Here, you have Usd 100.’ On Usd 
1,000, this is nothing. Or: ‘Please give me your number 
and I will send you phone credits afterwards.’ the officer 
can’t refuse [laughing].82 
a gang leader summarizes this system of patronage and 
protection using a Lingala proverb: ‘loboko oyo ekabaka, bakataka 
yango te [the hand that nourishes, one does not cut]’.83  
Often, state security services also forge relationships with gang 
members. a gang leader, interviewed for this project, described 
the following experience:
at one point in time the gang leader was wanted by the 
security services. He decided to present himself to a 
high-ranking Pnc officer to resolve the issue. the police 
on duty threw him in the police cell and lashed him. the 
next day, when they wanted to punish him again, doubling 
the number of lashes, the gang leader broke down and 
started crying. He begged the police not to hurt him, 
arguing that he did not know anything about what they 
wanted him to confess. He begged them instead to give 
him a fine, assuring the police officers that he had two 
goats at the house to offer them. after family members—
who were part of the Fardc—came and pleaded for him, 
the police commander finally agreed to release him. He 
took the gang leader to his jeep and drove him home, 
where the gang leader showed the police commander his 
81   Participant in Usalama Project III focus group with Pnc officers, Goma, 15 april 
2019.
82   Interview with gang member, Goma, 17 February 2017.
83   Interview with gang member, Goma, 15 May 2017. 
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goats. the commander refused the offer of the goats and 
instead gave the gang leader his phone number. 
after he recovered from his injuries, the gang leader 
brought the police commander a bag of charcoal and a 
goat as a gift. according to the gang leader, the police 
commander told him that if he continued in this this way, 
he would not have any problems. since then, the gang 
leader periodically provides the police commander with 
information about Goma’s criminal underworld. the gang 
leader said that after he called the police commander, some 
of the bandits he denounced are currently in Munzenze for 
the crimes they committed. 
By first lashing the gang leader while in his custody, the police 
commander forged a relationship with him. networks of crimi-
nals and state authorities are built on these kinds of mutually 
beneficial relationships, where one seeks protection, and the 
other information and financial rewards. 84 
Following the appointment of a new mayor in February 2018, 
the replacement of high-ranking Pnc and Fardc officials, 
and the change of governor twice in the post-election period, 
established patronage networks at different levels—within the 
municipal administration, military hierarchies and gang struc-
tures—have shifted and new structures appear to be in the 
making. the newly emerging patronage networks may create 
tensions between the various actors but they can also generate 
new operational spaces for insecurity actors.
84   Usalama Project III interview with gang leader, Goma, 5 april 2019.
5. responses to Insecurity in Goma
the inhabitants of Goma are generally frustrated with the state 
response to urban insecurity, violence and crime. they often 
blame the state security services for being complicit in criminal 
activities. In response, Goma communities are developing their 
own approaches to address insecurity in their neighbourhoods, 
which include popular demonstrations, youth policing groups 
and sometimes popular justice, which can result in suspects 
being killed by mobs. community responses can take the form 
of collective or individual action, through which citizens take 
responsibility into their own hands in a variety of ways. these 
actions are not, however, always constructive and can further 
reinforce the popular proliferation of urban violence, damaging 
relationships between residents. 
In this long list of responses to insecurity in Goma, the main 
absentees are the international actors. although the city hosts 
a large number of international humanitarian and development 
agencies, as well a huge Un blue helmet deployment, they are 
rarely involved in urban issues. Instead, they mainly focus on 
the security, humanitarian and development situation in Goma’s 
rural hinterlands.85 While MOnUscO performs motorized 
patrols with jeeps in the city, they do not have permission to 
intervene due to the rules and conditions under which they are 
deployed.  
Police and other local authorities
although Goma has a large deployment of police and military 
85   karen Büscher and koen Vlassenroot, ‘Humanitarian Presence and Urban 
development: new Opportunities and contrasts in Goma, drc’, Disasters 34/s2 (2010): 
s256–73.
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personnel compared to rural areas, police stations at the neigh-
bourhood level are largely understaffed and underequipped.86 an 
oft-cited complaint about police intervention is that it usually 
comes too late. a chef de quartier explains, ‘If we call the police for 
intervention, they respond that they do not have fuel. I wonder, 
if it is really up to me, the chef de quartier, to buy fuel for the 
police.’87 as well as fuel, police often lack the necessary vehicles 
(motorbikes, cars, jeeps) to operate effectively. For example, the 
police station in karisimbi commune has only one jeep to cover 
all eight of the neighbourhoods there.88 the ineffectiveness that 
results from their lack of resources, combined with the alleged 
Pnc complicity in urban crime, undermines the legitimacy of 
the police in the eyes of the local population. 
the state has not been entirely passive to rising levels of 
urban violence seen in Goma. In august 2017, for example, after 
more than ten murders in two weeks, the provincial general of 
the police activated emergency phone lines, which replaced an 
existing emergency call service that was seen as being largely 
dysfunctional.89 several interviewees, however, suggest that 
this was merely a symbolic action, since it has not resulted in a 
more efficient police approach.90 Generally, the state response at 
times of heightened levels of insecurity in Goma is to strengthen 
86   Underlying dynamics of the malfunctioning of the congolese police forces are 
described in detail elsewhere. see, for example: Maria Eriksson Baaz and Ola Olsson, 
‘Feeding the Horse: Unofficial Economic activities within the Police Force in the 
democratic republic of the congo’, African Security 4/4 (2011): 223–241; and Michel thill, 
‘Police at Work in Bukavu: negotiating revenue-Generation in Urban Pirate Markets’, 
in Negotiating Public Services in the Congo, eds. tom de Herdt and kristof titeca, p.120-141, 
London: Zed Books, 2019.
87   Usalama Project III interview with chef de quartier, Goma, 26 March 2019.
88   Usalama Project III interview with bourgmestre, Goma, 4 april 2019.
89   Patrick Maki, ‘Goma: La Police met deux numéros verts à la disposition de la 
population pour lutter contre l’insécurité’, Actualité CD, 21 august 2017. accessed 26 
June 2019, https://actualite.cd/2017/08/21/goma-la-police-met-deux-numeros-verts-la-
disposition-de-la-population-pour-lutter-contre.
90   Usalama Project III interview with member of the Association des jeunes, Goma, 14 
april 2019; Usalama Project III Interview with nGO staff member, Goma, 13 april 2019.
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security measures. Between February and april 2019, the result of 
this strategy was an increase of Fardc and Pnc units deployed 
in the neighbourhoods of ndosho and Mugunga, as well as an 
intensification of the mixed Pnc and PM patrols.91 as these 
patrols tend to stay on the main roads, however, people doubt 
their effectiveness.92 Moreover, they also often harass residents, 
extorting them of money and phones. 
Mugunga is an exception to the lack of police personnel: it is 
host to the more than 400 police officers of the GMI in a police 
training complex. compared to other Pnc units, the GMI are 
well-trained and equipped. Originally deployed in Goma during 
the election period (november – december 2018), they gradu-
ally started to take over some tasks of other Pnc units, such as 
reinforcing patrols and making arrests. their presence has made 
Mugunga one of the most militarized neighbourhoods in Goma. 
despite this, the Pnc has not succeeded in getting the insecurity 
situation under control. Police stations at the neighbourhood 
level closest to the population remain largely underequipped 
and understaffed, which provides operational space for crimi-
nals. More police deployment does not necessarily equate to 
more security, however. respondents often say that at night it is 
better to avoid the main roads, which are patrolled by the Pnc 
and PM.93
the high intensity of violence and the large number of casual-
ties in the early part of 2019 triggered extensive popular protest, 
putting pressure on the state authorities to react. the mayor 
of Goma has been the target of much blame for his inaction. In 
91   For example, a small Fardc post with three small tents was erected on the 
hill called Oping in ndosho and another on a hill north of ndosho in the territory of 
nyiragongo. 
92   Usalama Project III interview with leader Association des jeunes, Goma, 12 april 2019; 
Usalama Project III interviews with chef de quartiers, Goma, 26 March 2019.
93   Usalama Project III mental mapping exercise with residents ndosho, Goma, 9 april 
2019; Usalama Project III mental mapping exercise with residents Mugunga, Goma, 11 
april 2019.
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response, on 6 March 2019, he organized a meeting with cadres 
de base—the lowest municipal administrative level consisting 
of the chef de quartier (district chief), chefs de cellules (‘block’ 
chiefs), chefs d’avenues (avenue chiefs) and nyumba kumi (chief 
of ten houses)—and visited Mugunga. the manner in which he 
addressed Mugunga residents—lacking insights into neighbour-
hood realities—did not impress them.94 He made only vague 
promises of better instruction for the cadres de base and increased 
police deployment. the lack of confidence that local people have 
in the mayor has led to multiple requests, including from civil 
society and provincial MPs, to replace him.95
One popular measure taken by the municipal authorities in 
Goma is to control the movement of people so as to identify 
potential intruders in the neighbourhood. On 12 March 2019, 
the bourgmestre of the commune of Goma published a statement 
calling for the cadres de base to participate in the comprehensive 
control of movement through the (re)implementation of the 
system of jetons. these are tokens people receive after having 
registered with their chef de quartier, which must be carried similar 
to an identity card. this system was previously instituted in 2008 
but was later abandoned because it also facilitated more police 
harassment after dark; that is, police often request to see the 
jeton as a pretext for extortion.96
94   Usalama Project III informal conversations with several residents and youth leaders, 
Goma, 6 april 2019. the mayor states that urban insecurity is due both to inhabitants 
killing one another in score settling and to the role of foreign infiltrators; see: richard 
Mashuari kalirwa, ‘Le Maire Muisa nseke promet des solutions a l’insécurité dans son 
entité’, MediaCongo, 7 March 2019. accessed 26 June 2019, https://www.mediacongo.
net/article-actualite-48584_goma_le_maire_muisa_nkese_promet_des_solutions_a_l_
insecurite_dans_son_entite.html; kapinga, ‘tueries à Goma’.
95   Usalama Project III interview with member of La Lucha, Goma, 12 april 2019.
96   Usalama Project III mental mapping exercise with IdPs, Goma, 9 april 2019.
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civil society
responses to increasing levels of urban insecurity are also being 
organized by actors and associations framing themselves as part 
of urban civil society. In congo, La Société Civile (French; civil 
society) is an institutionalized entity, with a clear hierarchical 
structure from the national to the neighbourhood level. Outside 
this, there are other forms of civic engagement, such as the 
more recent urban phenomenon of citizen movements which 
claim to distance themselves from institutionalized civil society 
organizations.  
the security-related activities by institutionalized civil society 
associations mainly consist of three types of undertaking: 
documentation of cases, denouncing the government for malprac-
tice and advocating for reform. Institutionalized civil society 
associations do this by making declarations in the media, helping 
to mobilize people for strikes and public demonstrations, and 
producing recommendations and memoranda to government 
and other political officials. For example, in March 2019, after 
two months of murderous raids and kidnappings in Goma, the 
civil society of north kivu published a memorandum for better 
urban governance and management of the city, including of the 
police and the justice system. as a first step, they pleaded for the 
replacement of the current mayor, the provincial commissioner 
of the Pnc and the superior military prosecutor in Goma.97
In addition to the actions of institutionalized civil society 
organizations, other associations and movements engage in 
similar activities. Officially embedded in the state framework but 
in practice often situated in between the state and civil society, is 
the Association des jeunes (youth association), a nationwide organi-
zation with local branches at each governance level. the Association 
des jeunes in Goma interact with the local administration and also 
97   civil society north kivu, ‘Mémorandum portant demande de sécurité en Ville de 
Goma et ses environs’, Goma: civil society north kivu, March 2019. 
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have a wide range of connections to church leaders, leaders of 
social movements, nGOs and other actors across the broader 
civil society. For ndosho and Mugunga, the youth presidents 
and committee appear to be dynamic actors in terms of informa-
tion gathering, denouncing and advocacy. they record cases of 
insecurity in their neighbourhoods by mobilizing their members 
to keep track of incidents. Moreover, in kidnapping cases, the 
president of the Goma youth association instructs members to 
gather information so they try to trace the routes of the kidnap-
pers themselves, should the police remain inactive.98 
Following the kidnapping of three young men in Mugunga in 
March and april 2019, the president of the Goma youth associa-
tion spent considerable time and effort, including the use of his 
own network, trying to document the events and speaking with 
the families of the victims. Based on such documentation, they 
also formulate recommendations and advocate for the security 
of the inhabitants of their neighbourhoods.99 the Associations 
des jeunes generally have high levels of legitimacy among the 
inhabitants of Goma. as their structure is more horizontal and 
gender-balanced, they create a sense of shared engagement on 
the challenges of everyday urban insecurity. Moreover, they are 
rarely perceived as being corrupt or complicit in insecurity. 
Public demonstrations
a powerful response to urban insecurity reflecting the deep 
frustration and anger of the population in the face of inaction 
and suspected complicity on the part of the police and the army 
is the organization of public demonstrations. Between January 
and april 2019, almost all instances of violent kidnappings and 
98   Usalama Project III interview with vice president of Association des jeunes, Goma, 14 
april 2019; Usalama Project III interview with president of Association des jeunes, Goma, 12 
april 2019; Usalama Project III mental mapping exercise with IdPs, Goma, 11 april 2019. 
99   nsapu, ‘rdc tueries répétitives’. 
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killings were followed by marches, with different layers of the 
population participating to demand security and justice, and 
to end the ongoing violence through the intervention of the 
urban and provincial authorities. rather than being organized 
by one particular community organization or social movement, 
these protest actions often emerge from spontaneous outcries of 
frustration and anger, and are subsequently seized upon by insti-
tutionalized civil society organizations, which then afterwards 
claim their active role in the demonstrations.100 
citizen movements, such as the well-known La Lucha and 
Filimbi, also react to urban insecurity. these movements are 
comprised of mostly well-educated youth advocating for polit-
ical reform, human rights and basic services, including security. 
their actions have received considerable global media atten-
tion.101 their relationship with the congolese state is one of 
confrontation, often facing brutal state force during their demon-
strations.102 despite this attention and visibility, their legitimacy 
among urban inhabitants is limited, since they largely represent 
100   Usalama Project III focus group with citizen movements, Déboutists and Filimbi, 
Goma, 8 april 2019; Usalama Project III interview with president of Association des jeunes, 
Goma, 3 april 2019; Usalama Project III focus group with Association des jeunes, Goma, 1 
april 2019; Usalama Project III interview with member of La Lucha, Goma, 12 april 2019.
101   see for example: kristen chick, ‘these young people are fighting for the democratic 
republic of congo to live up to its name’, Los Angeles Times, 5 October 2018. accessed 
26 June 2019, https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-congo-democracy-20181004-story.
html; tom Wilson, ‘congolese activists on hunger strike after court refuses release’, 
The Guardian, 19 March 2016. accessed 26 June 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/mar/19/congolese-activists-on-hunger-strike-after-court-refuses-release. 
102   Human rights Watch, ‘dr congo, Youth activists rounded up at strike’, 
Human Rights Watch, 23 February 2016. accessed 26 June 2019, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2016/02/23/dr-congo-youth-activists-rounded-strike; Ismail akwei, ‘drc’s Lucha 
activists protest against filth in kinshasa; dozens arrested, Africanews, 27 april 2017. 
accessed 09 July 2019, https://www.africanews.com/2017/04/27/drc-s-lucha-activists-
protest-against-filth-in-kinshasa-dozens-arrested/.
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a specific highly educated class.103 at the neighbourhood level, 
ndosho has its own citizen movement called les Deboutistes. 
Examples of actions they have taken are planting of trees in 
the neighbourhood and organizing a march, with participants 
carrying empty water cans to demand better access to water in 
the neighbourhood.104 
these different actors sometimes join forces to organize more 
regular actions or interventions. For example, in February 2019, 
La Lucha and the Association des jeunes wrote a letter and organized 
a petition demanding the dismissal of both the mayor of Goma 
and the provincial general of the police. In the same month, 
the same collective organized a similar petition calling for the 
dismissal of provincial deputies. In part due to their efforts, 
a motion was passed in the national assembly and a group of 
provincial ministers went to kinshasa to advocate for security 
interventions in Goma. a delegation was sent from kinshasa to 
Goma on 2 april for a fieldwork mission during which research 
was done on the recent insecurity. after the delegation returned 
to kinshasa, however, no significant action followed.105
community action and youth policing groups
Faced with urban crime, people in Goma have started to act 
collectively, based on a shared sense of abandonment by the 
government. these forms of collective action are not formally 
organized but rather consist of local initiatives, which can never-
theless be effective. these community initiatives are generally 
characterized by a diversity typical to most urban environments. 
103   International crisis Group, ‘Boulevard of Broken dreams: the “street” and politics 
in the drc’, 13 June 2016. accessed 26 June 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/
central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/boulevard-broken-dreams-street-and-politics-
dr-congo.
104   Usalama Project III focus group with Déboutists, Goma, 8 april 2019. 
105   Usalama Project III interview with member of La Lucha, Goma, 12 april 2019.
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they include members of different ethnic communities who 
live together in their respective urban neighbourhoods and 
compared to the rural hinterlands are less mobilized around 
ethnic community identity. 
at the neighbourhood level, alert systems are put in place 
by local residents to warn neighbours in case of danger. these 
systems mostly operate at night. For example, when bandits try 
to break into a house, people alert one another by screaming for 
help and making loud noises with whistles, tambourines and 
sirens. When such an event happens close to the incident taking 
place, however, this can be risky.106 One respondent narrates 
how during one night-time armed robbery, the bandits shouted: 
‘those who do not bleed can open their mouths and shout. But 
if you know you bleed, you better shut up. those who leave their 
house or scream will be shot immediately.’107 In these cases, 
another means of informing local residents of danger is to send 
an sMs to neighbours living at a further distance from the crime 
taking place, who can then start to make noise. although limited 
in scope, alert systems serve as bottom-up first-line security 
measures to protect residents from criminality. 
another community response to insecurity is youth policing 
groups and self-defence systems. Over the years, urban youth have 
been engaged in addressing crime and insecurity by patrolling 
the streets at night, retrieving stolen goods, looking for wanted 
criminals, as well as guarding the neighbourhood, markets and 
other public spaces. these groups are generally motivated by 
the powerful idea of auto-prise en charge (French; taking care of 
oneself). this idea originates from the economic and political 
crisis in the 1980s under President Mobutu, whereby people 
were called upon to organize themselves around the provision 
of public goods and services, such as security, because the state 
106   Usalama Project III interview with four women, Goma, 27 March 2019. 
107   Usalama Project III interview with chef d’avenue, Goma, 26 March 2019.
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was unable to do so.108
a popular form of such initiatives are the auto-defence (Fench; 
self-defence) groups organized by neighbourhood youth who 
patrol and set up barriers at night to exercise security controls. 
Generally unarmed, they work on a voluntary basis yet often ask 
for voluntary financial contributions for their services from the 
people under their protection.109 at present, however, in light of 
the extreme violence used in robberies and kidnappings, these 
self-defence groups no longer enjoy the same support they 
used to from the municipal authorities and are largely being 
discouraged because of the risks associated with patrols for the 
participating youth.110 as a cadre de base states, ‘We cannot sacri-
fice the population like that.’111 the chef de quartier adjoint (deputy 
to the chef de quartier) of ndosho, who once participated in the 
mixed patrols as a civilian, explains, ‘today, young people stay 
at home. they have whistles and tambourines to make noise 
at night but if they march during the night, they can encounter 
soldiers and police officers. they can kill them [youths].112
nonetheless, for the neighbourhoods of ndosho and Mugunga, 
these initiatives have not completely vanished. In Mugunga, a 
key youth leader created an ad hoc self-defence system, only 
operational when needed. after the killings and kidnappings 
in Mugunga in February and March 2019, these youths under-
took their own investigations. In collaboration with the head 
of the neighbouring administrative authority, in rusayu, they 
succeeded in arresting two suspects and confiscated one machine 
108   Judith Verweijen, ‘Between “Justice” and “Injustice”: Justice Populaire in the 
Eastern dr congo’, JsrP Policy Brief 4, London: the Justice and security research 
Programme, august 2016; Judith Verweijen, ‘From autochthony to Violence? discursive 
and coercive social Practices of the Mai-Mai in Fizi, Eastern dr congo’, African Studies 
Review 58/2 (2015): 157–180, 162.
109   Büscher, ‘conflict, state Failure’.  
110   Usalama Project III interview with bourgmestre, Goma, 4 april 2019.
111   Usalama Project III interview with chef de quartier, Goma, 26 March 2019.
112   Usalama Project III interview with chef de quartier adjoint, Goma, 26 March 2019.
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gun on the outskirts of the territory of nyiragongo, bordering 
Mugunga. the following day, they found several kilogrammes of 
ammunition and another machine gun hidden in a shop in the 
neighbourhood, which they handed over to the police.113
the association for the development of nyabushongo (adn), 
operating in ndosho, is another example of an active youth self-
defence initiative. In addition to their objective of promoting 
neighbourhood development, the adn also aim to protect people 
and their goods. In small groups, adn youth divide themselves 
among four sections of the neighbourhood after dark. through 
walkie-talkies and whistles, they communicate and alert each 
other in case of trouble. they collaborate well with the Pnc, 
often handing over alleged thieves to the nearby police station in 
nyabushongo. the adn also dispenses its own justice, however; 
for example, by beating up thieves.114 residents generally have a 
positive perception of the adn and their work.115 according to 
their coordinator, one reason for this is that adn members work 
on a voluntary basis: ‘You can motivate us [give some money] if 
you are happy with our service.’116 In contrast, as another adn 
member explains, ‘the anti-gang pass from shop to shop to ask 
for cdF 200 [Usd 0.12]. We [adn] don’t.’117 
anti-gangs are another popular urban policing actor that have 
been active in Goma for more than ten years. Being gangs118 and 
sportifs (trained in the martial arts), and armed with nunchakus 
113   Usalama Project III interview with leader of the Association des jeunes, Goma, 4 april 
2019.
114   Usalama Project III interview with coordinator and chef de sécurité of adn, Goma, 10 
april 2019.
115     Usalama Project III mental mapping exercise with youth, Goma, 9 april 2019.  
116   Usalama Project III focus group with adn and the Association des jeunes, Goma, 10 
april 2019. 
117   Usalama Project III interview with coordinator and chef de sécurité of adn, Goma, 10 
april 2019. 
118   In Goma, the word ‘gang’ denotes a person that is tough and has gang-like qualities 
rather than a group of people involved in illicit behaviour. nevertheless, many of them 
are involved in criminal activities. 
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(Japanese; martial arts weapon), they claim to protect people 
against the everyday crime and violence of the maibobo and 
thieves. they were founded in 2007 to protect the market of 
Virunga and because of their success, gradually started operating 
throughout the city. In the ndosho neighbourhood, a group of 
around 10 to 20 anti-gang people have been especially active 
around the commercial hotspot of station simba and the traffic 
point of terminus. during the day, people can call on them when 
their belongings are stolen, such as mobile phones, or when they 
are threatened by maibobo or gangs. For a small fee, the anti-gang 
group will try to retrieve the phone or deter the maibobo or gang 
from causing trouble.119
In return for their protection, anti-gang members ask for a 
weekly voluntary contribution of cdF 200 (Usd 0.12) per shop 
and vendor in their area of operation. since their inception, their 
activities have been in flux, directly linked to whether they have 
had the support of the mayor or police officials. during times of 
support, they frequently carried out jobs for them; for example, 
to look for wanted persons, evict pirate markets or provide 
muscle at public demonstrations. at the same time, they often 
get into conflict with some of these actors, after which they can 
end up in prison or are forced into hiding. In general, the people 
of ndosho tend to have negative perceptions of the anti-gangs. 
In large part, this is due to the fact that their weekly voluntary 
contributions are becoming less and less voluntary. Moreover, 
the anti-gangs have been blamed for complicity in much of the 
crime occurring in the neighbourhood. a local shop keeper sums 
up the situation:
the anti-gang… ah, they are also gangs. they smoke 
weed. they [gangs and anti-gangs] know each other. they 
pretend to fight the maibobo, and afterwards they ask for 
119   Maarten Hendriks, ‘the Politics of Everyday Policing in Goma: the case of the 
anti-Gang’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 1/2 (2018): 274–289.
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money. I give them cdF 200 [Usd 0.12] every week. If you 
don’t pay, they can take your goods. they say the money is 
for their maître [French; master]. they are karateka [person 
who practices karate]. I never asked them their documents 
but they work for city hall.120 
this demonstrates how the position and legitimacy of anti-
gang groups in urban society in Goma is shifting and unstable. 
after multiple complaints and denunciations from people living 
and working in ndosho, and the collapse of their patronage 
network—a new mayor was installed and a high-ranking police 
commander who was affiliated with the group was relocated—
it has become more difficult for anti-gangs to operate. after 
the 2019 elections, at the initiative of the Déboutists, they were 
violently chased from the neighbourhood. One of them was 
also seriously beaten. since then, there has been little anti-gang 
activity in ndosho.121
Popular justice
a final important collective response to mounting insecurity is 
popular justice. In Goma, this generally refers to a type of mob 
justice, where alleged thieves who are apprehended are either 
stoned to death or burned alive by a crowd of people. this 
form of popular justice has been on the rise in recent years.122 
the following example illustrates how an incident of popular 
justice can take place. after an armed robbery of a young 
couple in ndosho, one of the bandits was overpowered by 
the husband. responding to the neighbourhood alert system, 
people began to arrive and interrogated the culprit about his 
120   Informal conversation with shop owner, Goma, 12 november 2015.
121   Usalama Project III focus group with Déboutists, Goma, 8 april 2019; Usalama 
Project III focus group with anti-gang, Goma 5 april 2019.
122   Mairie de Goma, 2016; Marie de Goma, 2017.
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accomplices, who had already fled. He remained silent and was 
taken to a nearby intersection, where a crowd of people from 
different parts of the neighbourhood then stoned him. Hours 
later the police arrived and took him to the hospital, where 
he eventually died. no police investigations were conducted. 
as the chef de quartier adjoint of ndosho pointedly asks, ‘Who 
are we going to arrest?’123 a crucial characteristic of this type 
of popular justice is that it is difficult to identify individual 
perpetrators. as one community member explains: 
People come from far away to look and participate. Men, 
women, children, everyone. But the people from right 
here, no. the neighbours and victims [of the robbery] just 
observe. … Even the chef can’t show himself. Otherwise he 
is complicit [in the act of popular justice].124 
to prevent persecution and out of fear for reprisals by the 
accomplices and loved ones of the thief being killed, interviewees 
argued that those directly affected do not participate in the act of 
killing. For that same reason, the young couple that was targeted 
by the bandits in the above case moved to another location to 
hide themselves for a while, even their neighbours did not know 
where.125
Popular justice does not only target thieves. It also can be 
directed at those seen to cause harm to the community but who 
escape punishment. Popular justice therefore can be under-
stood as an attempt to re-establish norms of justice in a state 
of violence and impunity.126 In May 2019, the office of the chef de 
quartier and the attached police station of kyeshero were being 
123   Usalama Project III interview with chef de quartier adjoint, Goma, 26 March 2019. 
124   Usalama Project III focus group with three women and chef d’avenue, Goma, 27 
March 2019.
125   Usalama Project III focus group with three women and chef d’avenue, Goma, 27 
March 2019.
126   Verweijen, ‘Between “Justice” and “Injustice”’, 2016.
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rebuilt after they had been burned to the ground by an angry 
mob. this followed an event in March 2019, when people caught 
a thief at station simba, located at a busy traffic point in ndosho. 
Fearing for his life, the thief tried to reach the police station of 
kyeshero, south of ndosho. a Pnc officer based at the station 
saw the crowd approaching and fired his gun to disperse the 
crowd, accidently killing a young woman selling sugar cane at 
the side of the road. In response, the crowd turned its anger on 
the police station and the adjacent office of the chef de quartier, 
setting them both on fire.
community responses can take the form of collective civil 
attitudes and engagements by which citizens take responsibility 
into their own hands. But these actions are not always beneficial 
for social cohesion and can further reinforce the popular prolif-
eration of urban violence. 
Individual responses
Goma residents have tried to adapt to changing security situa-
tions by taking a range of individual measures to protect 
themselves and their families. these measures strongly depend 
on the socio-economic status and the networks of those who take 
individual action. One radical response to insecurity is simply to 
move. during periods of heightened insecurity, those who have 
money, connections and the right papers often cross the border 
to rwanda, returning to Goma once the situation has stabilized. 
similarly, after experiencing a robbery at home, those able to 
do so can move to a safer part of the city.127 Others opt to hire a 
police officer for personal protection. the advantage of hiring a 
private police officer, rather than a private security company, is 
127   Usalama Project III interview with bourgmestre, Goma, 4 april 2019; Usalama Project 
III mental mapping exercise with residents ndosho, Goma, 9 april 2019.
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that they are armed.128
as many robberies are targeted, people generally 
avoid walking around the neighbourhood with money. a 
businesswoman from Mugunga explains: 
I was attacked by armed men in my shop the day I received 
Usd 800 as my share of likelemba [a local saving system]. 
army soldiers came and asked me for exactly the same 
amount of money that I just received! they started 
shooting and entered here. also at my neighbours. they 
took everything and attacked my son, who was sixteen 
years old. We spent six months in the hospital with him.129
some local saving groups have adapted their payment 
systems by rotating the role of the treasurer. While previously 
they would work with a fixed calendar for payments, now the 
payment timetable is no longer communicated to the members 
and the treasurer contacts members individually. this shows 
how violence puts pressure on urban collective resilience 
mechanisms and forces people to adapt to the current context 
of insecurity. 
despite the risk of carrying money, there is also risk in 
having no money—should you be the target of a robbery. For 
example, a ndosho resident explains how in January 2018, 
around ten men in Fardc uniforms entered his house, 
shooting. He and his wife tried to hide in the bedroom but 
the soldiers broke in. When he told them he did not have 
any money, they shot again. His wife intervened, giving the 
soldiers Usd 360 that she had received from their daughter. 
128   Private security companies have become a booming business in Goma since 
2007, partly due to the growing presence of banks and international humanitarian and 
development organizations. see: karen Büscher and koen Vlassenroot, ‘Humanitarian 
Presence and Urban development: new Opportunities and contrasts in Goma, drc’, 
Disasters 34/2 (2010): 256–273.
129   Usalama Project III interview with businesswomen, Goma, 25 March 2019.
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‘Luckily’, he said. ‘Otherwise they could have killed me.’130 
the situation in Goma has deteriorated so much that children 
are kept inside during times of high insecurity and everyone 
rushes home after dark—even going out of the main house to 
the toilet is a risk.131 Many mothers, fearful of their children being 
kidnapped, try to sensitize and educate them, advising them to 
exercise caution.132 Widely used security mechanisms, including 
double locks and dogs, are no longer seen as being very effective.
130   Usalama Project III interview with resident, Goma, 27 March 2019.
131   Usalama Project III focus group with female traders, Goma, 9 april 2019.
132   Usalama Project III focus group with female traders, Goma, 9 april 2019; Usalama 
Project III interview with mother of three boys, Goma, 10 april 2019. 
6. conclusions and Policy considerations 
Urban insecurity has become part of daily life in Goma and city 
residents have become accustomed to the general passivity of 
the security forces and state authorities in responding to it. to 
address urban insecurity in Goma, policymakers should take the 
time to listen to and better understand the experiences of city 
residents and their proposals about how to tackle the situation. 
Five considerations follow for those who seek to positively influ-
ence urban insecurity.
Put urban on the security agenda
Urban security and protection is not generally seen as a priority 
in eastern congo. Both the international community and the 
provincial authorities overlook cities and urban dynamics in their 
agendas for conflict resolution and mediation, peacebuilding, 
disarmament and protection. Investing in security in Goma 
will require not only a shift or broadening of agendas, but will 
also entail adapting existing knowledge and approaches. Urban 
governance structures are organized differently from those at the 
rural level, characterized by a multitude of overlapping services 
and actors. several dimensions of urban insecurity in Goma are 
similar to dynamics in other congolese cities that are not in 
conflict zones, suggesting the need to move beyond a conflict 
framework. a commitment to address urban insecurity should 
also translate to an extensive investment in urban infrastructure, 
such as public lighting. 
Increase deployment of properly trained security 
personnel
a large number of Pnc and Fardc units are deployed in 
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Goma. as the headquarters of the provincial government, the 
state security services are more prevalent in the city than in 
the rural hinterlands. at the same time, police stations at the 
neighbourhood level are inadequately staffed and equipped. at 
night, far away from the main roads where mixed patrols of 
the Pnc and PM units operate, thieves, bandits and kidnappers 
move about freely. to tackle this issue, Pnc stations and Fardc 
positions in the peripheral neighbourhoods of Goma should be 
reinforced and police given adequate training and resources to 
carry out their jobs effectively. However, the deployment of more 
police and military does not always mean better security. In fact, 
residents frequently complain about harassment by Pnc and 
Fardc units. therefore, training and financial resources are as 
important as sheer numbers of security personnel. to this end, 
donors should commit to the ongoing comprehensive police 
reform in the congo to support proper training and deployment.
End impunity by addressing complicity
Impunity is repeatedly cited as one of the key underlying drivers 
of urban insecurity in Goma. this is the result of the logic of 
complicity and mutual dependence between the state security 
forces and criminals. this dependency needs to be disentangled 
for impunity to be addressed. to do this, it is not enough to 
invest in the juridical aspects of prosecution, detention and the 
rule of law. It is also important to understand the key interests 
at stake in patronage networks. Only with this knowledge will it 
be possible to start to dismantle a system that rewards violence 
and harassment at all levels. 
address the urban dimension of armed group activities
to understand processes of insecurity in Goma, the position of 
the city needs to be understood in its broader economic, political 
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and military dynamics. to make sense of urban violence, crime 
and insecurity, connections between armed groups and urban 
elites or economic actors need to be further investigated. cities 
may present more complex operational grounds for armed 
groups, working through a complex network of actors and 
spaces, yet the intimate connections between urban markets 
and armed actors need to be taken into account when addressing 
urban violence and dismantling criminal networks. attention to 
these issues should not render invisible other local dynamics. 
competition over highly valuable urban land or business-related 
power struggles may be at the source of some violent forms of 
urban insecurity. narratives that put armed groups at the centre 
of the problem must be approached cautiously, in recognition 
of their potential role to be powerful mechanisms for political 
mobilizing. 
Include youth in programmes to address urban insecurity
Youth play an active role in community attempts to address 
insecurity. they are capable and skilled enough to occupy 
parts of the political space that can put pressure on govern-
ment to address security-related issues. Including youth in 
urban security governance should be done with a degree of 
caution and outcomes assessed critically. at the same time, 
there are examples of good practice, notably the Associations 
des jeunes at the neighbourhood level, which benefits from high 
levels of legitimacy among the urban population. these forms 
of proximity between urban residents and security providers 
are key to limit the space for criminals in the neighbourhood. 
By supporting structures such as this, their connections to the 
Goma administration and the security forces could be further 
strengthened and institutionalized.
conclusions anD policy consiDerations
Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases
adn association for the development of nyabushongo
aFdL Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la Libération du 
Congo-Zaïre (democratic allied Forces for the 
Liberations of congo-Zaire)
anr L’Agence National de Reseignement (national 
Intelligence agency)
Association des jeunes youth association linked to the congolese 
administration 
auto-prise en charge (French) taking care of oneself; a popular phrase 
used in various contexts but mostly refers to taking 
matters of security and justice into one’s own hands 
Banyarwanda (Swahili) those coming from rwanda
bourgmestre  (French) deputy-mayor, an officially elected urban 
administrative position heading the commune
cadre de base (French) lowest level municipal administration 
position, consisting of the chef de quartier, chefs de 
cellules, chefs d’avenues and nyumba kumi (chief of ten 
houses)
chef d’avenue (French) the head of one avenue
chef de quartier (French) district chief; an official position in the 
urban administrative structure and officially 
appointed by the elected bourgmestre
chef de quartier adjoint  (French) deputy to the chef de quartier 
cIat  from the French word commissariat (police station)
cndP Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (national 
congress for the defence of the People)
commune (French) the largest administrative entity of the city; 
Goma is divided into two communes: karisimbi and 
Goma
drc democratic republic of congo
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Fardc Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo 
(armed Forces of the democratic republic of 
congo)
FdLr Forces Démocratique de Libération du Rwanda 
(democratic Forces for the Liberation of rwanda)
figurants (French) figurants
Filimbi (Swahili) whistle. Urban-based citizen movement. 
GMI Groupe Mobile d’Intervention (Mobile Group of 
Intervention), a unit of the Pnc
IdP  internally displaced person
jeton (French) token
LUcHa Lutte pour le Changement (Fight for change). Urban-
based citizen movement which originally started in 
Goma.
M23 Mouvement du 23 Mars (Movement of 23 March)
maibobo (Swahili) street children
MOnUscO Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la 
Stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo 
(United nations Organization stabilization Mission 
in the democratic republic of the congo)
Munzenze  the name of the central prison Goma
parquet  (French) prosecutor’s office
PM (French) police militaire (the military police), a unit of 
the Fardc
Pnc Police Nationale Congolaise (congolese national 
Police)
quartier (French) urban administrative entity below the 
commune level and above cellule and avenue levels
rcd Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (congolese 
rally for democracy)
sous-cIat (French) sous-commissariat, the lowest level police 
station
glossary of acronyms, worDs anD phrases
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Ambiguous Order: Youth 
Groups and Urban Policing in 
the Congo
this briefing examines the struc-
ture, operations and social function 
of youth policing groups in Bukavu, 
Goma and Uvira.
Un microcosme de militarisation: 
Conflit, gouvernance et 
mobilization armée en  
territoire d’Uvira
ce rapport analyse la militarisation  
en territoire d’Uvira et la manière 
dont celle-ci façonne les rapports 
entre conflits locaux, gouvernance  
et mobilisation armée.
Contesting Authority:  
Armed rebellion and military 
fragmentation in Walikale and 
Kalehe, North and South Kivu
this report analyses the involve-
ment of armed groups in public 
life in the territories of kalehe and 
Walikale, which has led to further 
militarization and fragmentation of 
public space and social interactions.
Recycling Rebels: 
Demobilization in the Congo
this briefing analyses why and how 
previous ddr processes have failed, 
and provides a sketch of the current 
state of affairs and future prospects 
for demobilization.
Comprendre la prolifération 
des groupes armés dans l’est 
du Congo
ce briefing examine les principaux 
mécanismes qui sous-tendent la 
prolifération des groups armés dans 
l’est du congo pour venir à bout  
de cette problématique.
South Kivu: Identity, territory 
and power in the eastern Congo
this report outlines the historical 
dynamics behind the armed move-
ments in south kivu, focusing on 
the period before and leading up to 
the First congo War. 
Nord-Kivu: Contexte historique 
du conflit dans la province du 
Nord-Kivu, à l’est du Congo
ce rapport résume le contexte 
historique de la profusion des 
groupes armés qui ont surgit dans 
les deux dernières décennies dans  
la province du nord-kivu en rdc.
The national army and armed 
groups in the eastern Congo: 
Untangling the Gordian knot  
of insecurity
the final report of phase I of the 
Usalama Project presents con-
clusions from 18 months of field 
research on the national army and 
armed groups in the eastern drc 
focussing on armed mobilization in 
north and south kivu, the Fardc 
and a critical review of past and 
current efforts in the field of de-
mobilization and army reform.
The Ebb and Flow of 
Stabilization in the Congo
this briefing examines the mixed 
approach of MOnUscO towards 
the implementation of the I4s and 
suggests that it would be appro-
priate for the Un mission and its 
partners to continue to advance  
this framework.
since the start of 2019, a series of murders, violent 
robberies and kidnappings have taken place in 
peripheral neighbourhoods of goma. the rapid 
rise in violent crime has alarmed city residents 
and led to calls for the local government and 
security services to respond more effectively. this 
report maps out the dynamics and experiences of, 
and responses to, urban insecurity in goma, and 
makes the case for national and international 
policymakers to engage seriously with the urban 
dimension of insecurity in the eastern congo.
